All sessions will be held in A112 South Wilson Hall.

Friday May 15

4:15 pm – 5:30 pm
Speaker: Max Kölbel (Birmingham)
Title: “Should we be pluralists about truth?”
Chair: Nikolaj Jang Pedersen (UCLA)

5:45 pm – 7:00 pm
Speaker: Michael Lynch (UCONN)
Title: “The Unity and Diversity of Truth”
Chair: Marcus Rossberg (UCONN)

7:30 pm – 9:30 pm Banquet (sign up required)

Saturday May 16

9:30 am - 10:15 am
Speaker: Pascal Engel (Geneva)
Title: “Alethic Functionalism and the Norm of Truth”
Chair: Cory Wright (CSU Long Beach)

10:30 am - 12:00 pm
Speaker: Marian David (Notre Dame)
Title: “Lynch's Functionalist Theory of Truth”
Chair: Crawford Elder (UCONN)

12:00 pm - 1:30 pm Lunch (A124 Wilson)

Sunday May 17

10:30 am-11:45 am
Speaker: Jc Beall (UCONN)
Title: “Truth, Abnormal Worlds, and Necessity”
Chair: Don Baxter (UCONN)

12:00-1:15 pm
Speaker: Vann McGee (MIT)
Title: “The Margin-for-Error Paradox”
Chair: Colin Caret (St. Andrews)
Max Kölbel: “Should we be pluralists about truth?”

Should we be pluralists about truth? Recently several philosophers have posed the question whether there are one or more properties of truth. In this paper, I propose a methodological framework within which to address this question. I distinguish the question of how many, and which, concepts of truth there are from the question of how many, and which, properties of truth there are. With regard to the first question, I propose various empirical and conceptual approaches, and outline an argument that there are at least two pre-theoretical concepts of truth in circulation both in ordinary and philosophical discourse. With regard to the second question, I suggest that the question must be posed on the background of some metaphysical, explanatory or epistemological project. I then examine some possible such projects and the answers that might be given to the second question with regard to them.

Michael Lynch: “The Unity and Diversity of Truth”

Alethic monism is the view that there is one and only one property that makes judgments true. Monism has all the virtues of tradition and simplicity. But it also has unnoticed costs. One of those costs is that adopting monism makes it extremely difficult for us to make sense of two desiderata for any theory of judgment: its unity and its diversity. In this paper, I argue that we would be better off giving up on monism. Rejecting monism means either embracing the idea that there is no property that makes judgments true, or there is more than one. I argue that we should we take the latter path and understand truth as immanent in more than one property.

Marian David: “Lynch’s Functionalist Theory of Truth”

In this paper, I want to discuss some aspects of Michael Lynch’s functionalist theory of truth, as presented in his new book *Truth as One and Many* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2009). I will focus, almost exclusively, on the fourth chapter which contains the heart of Lynch’s theory; it has the same title as the book: Truth as One and Many.

Gila Sher: “Unity & Diversity in the Field of Truth: Pluralism within the Bounds of Correspondence”

Contemporary substantivists about truth tie the substantiveness of truth with its plurality. The specific principles underlying truth in different areas, they rightly argue, are substantive. But this pluralism is often conceived as involving principles so radically different from each other—correspondence, coherence, superwarrant, etc.—that the resulting theory is highly disunified. The theory of truth proposed in this paper aims to increase the unity of truth without reducing its substantiveness. Truth, according to this theory, is correspondence throughout, but correspondence itself is, potentially, a family of interconnected principles, some of which are more dominant in some fields (from some perspectives), others in other fields (from other perspectives). Generalizing an idea due to Horgan, I will focus on correspondence in two highly abstract fields: mathematics and logic.